It may come as a surprise to those fresh to the topic that the fields of philosophy of science and philosophy of technology show such great differences, given that few practices in our society are as closely related as science and technology. Experimental science is nowadays crucially dependent on technology for the realization of its research setups and for the creation of circumstances in which a phenomenon will become observable.

Theoretical research within technology has come to be often indis- tinguishable from theoretical research in science, making engineering science largely continuous with ‗ordinary‘ or ‗pure‘ science. This is a relatively recent development, which started around the middle of the nineteenth century, and is responsible for great differences between modern technology and traditional, craft-like techniques. The educa- tional training that aspiring scientists and engineers receive starts off being largely identical and only gradually diverges into a science or an engineering curriculum.

Ever since the scientific revolution of, primarily, the seventeenth century, characterized by its two major innovations, the experimental method and the mathematical articulation of scientific theories, philo- sophical reflection on science has concentrated on the method by which scientific knowledge is generated, on the reasons for thinking scientific theories to be true, and on the nature of evidence and the reasons for accepting one theory and rejecting another. Hardly ever have philoso- phers of science posed questions that did not have the community of scientists, their concerns, their aims, their intuitions, their arguments and choices, as a major target. In contrast it is only recently that the philoso- phy of technology has discovered the community of engineers.

To say that it is understandable that philosophy of technology, but not philosophy of science, has targeted first of all the impact of technol-

ogy – and with it science – on society and culture, because science af- fects society only through technology, will not do. Right from the start of the scientific revolution, science affected human culture and thought fundamentally and directly, not with a detour through technology, and the same is true for later developments such as relativity, atomic physics and quantum mechanics, the theory of evolution, genetics, biochemistry, and the increasingly dominating scientific world view overall. Philoso- phers of science overwhelmingly give the impression that they leave questions addressing the normative, social and cultural aspects of sci- ence gladly to other philosophical disciplines, or to historical studies. There are exceptions, however, and things may be changing; Philip Kitcher, to name but one prominent philosopher of science, has since 2000 written books on the relation of science to politics, ethics and reli- gion.

There is a major difference between the historical development of modern technology as compared to modern science which may at least partly explain this situation, which is that science emerged in the seven- teenth century from philosophy itself. The answers that Galileo, Huy- gens, Newton, and others gave, by which they initiated the alliance of empiricism and mathematical description that is so characteristic of modern science, were answers to questions that had belonged to the core business of philosophy since antiquity. Science, therefore, kept the at- tention of philosophers. Philosophy of science is a transformation of epistemology in the light of the emergence of science.

The foundational issues – the reality of atoms, the status of causality and probability, questions of space and time, the nature of the quantum world – that were so lively discussed during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century are an illustration of this close relationship between scientists and philosophers. No such intima- cy has ever existed between those same philosophers and technologists; their worlds still barely touch. To be sure, a case can be made that, compared to the continuity existing between natural philosophy and sci- ence, a similar continuity exists between central questions in philosophy having to do with human action and practical rationality and the way technology approaches and systematizes the solution of practical prob- lems. To investigate this connection may indeed be considered a major theme for philosophy of technology, and more is said on it in Sections

2.3 and 2.4.

This continuity appears only by hindsight, however, and dimly, as the historical development is at most a slow convening of various strands of philosophical thinking on action and rationality, not a devel- opment into variety from a single origin. Significantly it is only the aca- demic outsider Ellul who has, in his idiosyncratic way, recognized in technology the emergent single dominant way of answering all ques- tions concerning human action, comparable to science as the single dominant way of answering all questions concerning human knowledge. But Ellul was not so much interested in investigating this relationship as in emphasizing and denouncing the social and cultural consequences as he saw them. It is all the more important to point out that humanities philosophy of technology cannot be differentiated from analytic philos- ophy of technology by claiming that only the former is interested in the social environment of technology. There are studies which are rooted in analytic philosophy of science but address specifically the relation of technology to society and culture, and equally the relevance of social relations to the practice of technology, without taking an evaluative stand with respect to technology; an example is.

In focusing on the practice of technology as sustained by engineers, similar to the way philosophy of science focuses on the practice of sci- ence as sustained by scientists, analytic philosophy of technology could be thought to amount to the philosophy of engineering. Indeed many of the issues related to design, discussed below in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, could be singled out as forming the subject matter of the philosophy of engineering. The metaphysical issues discussed in Section 2.5 could not, however, and analytic philosophy of technology is therefore significant- ly broader than philosophy of engineering. This is reflected in the very title of Philosophy of technology and engineering sciences, an extensive up-to-date overview, which contains contributions to all of the topics treated here.

An undergraduate-level textbook which may serve as an introduction to the field is. The close relationship between the practices of science and technology may easily keep the important differences between the two from view. The predominant position of science in the philosophi- cal field of vision made it difficult for philosophers to recognize that technology merits special attention for involving issues that do not emerge in science. This view resulting from this lack of recognition is often presented, perhaps somewhat dramatically, as coming down to a claim that technology is ‗merely‘ applied science.

A questioning of the relation between science and technology was the central issue in one of the earliest discussions among analytic phi- losophers of technology. In 1966, in a special issue of the journal Tech- nology and Culture, Henryk Skolimowski argued that technology is something quite different from science. As he phrased it, science con- cerns itself with what is, whereas technology concerns itself with what is to be.

A few years later, in his well-known book The sciences of the artifi- cial, Herbert Simon emphasized this important distinction in almost the same words, stating that the scientist is concerned with how things are but the engineer with how things ought to be. Although it is difficult to imagine that earlier philosophers were blind to this difference in orienta- tion, their inclination, in particular in the tradition of logical empiricism, to view knowledge as a system of statements may have led to a convic- tion that in technology no knowledge claims play a role that cannot also be found in science. The study of technology, therefore, was not ex- pected to pose new challenges nor hold surprises regarding the interests of analytic philosophy.

In contrast, Mario Bunge defended the view that technology is ap- plied science, but in a subtle way that does justice to the differences be- tween science and technology. Bunge acknowledges that technology is about action, but an action heavily underpinned by theory – that is what distinguishes technology from the arts and crafts and puts it on a par with science.

According to Bunge, theories in technology come in two types: sub- stantive theories, which provide knowledge about the object of action, and operative theories, which are concerned with action itself. The sub- stantive theories of technology are indeed largely applications of scien- tific theories. The operative theories, in contrast, are not preceded by scientific theories but are born in applied research itself. Still, as Bunge claims, operative theories show a dependency on science in that in such theories the method of science is employed. This includes such features as modeling and idealization, the use of theoretical concepts and ab- stractions, and the modification of theories by the absorption of empiri- cal data through prediction and retrodiction.

In response to this discussion, Ian Jarvie proposed as important ques- tions for a philosophy of technology an inquiry into the epistemological status of technological statements and the way technological statements are to be demarcated from scientific statements. This suggests a thor-

ough investigation of the various forms of knowledge occurring in either practice, in particular, since scientific knowledge has already been so extensively studied, of the forms of knowledge that are characteristic of technology and are lacking, or of much less prominence, in science. A distinction between ‗knowing that‘ – traditional propositional knowledge – and ‗knowing how‘ – non-articulated and even impossible- to-articulate knowledge – had been introduced by Gilbert Ryle in a dif- ferent context.

The notion of ‗knowing how‘ was taken up by Michael Polanyi un- der the name of tacit knowledge and made a central characteristic of technology; the current state of the philosophical discussion is presented in this encyclopedia‘s entry on knowledge how. However, emphasizing too much the role of unarticulated knowledge, of ‗rules of thumb‘ as they are often called, easily underplays the importance of rational meth- ods in technology. An emphasis on tacit knowledge may also be ill-fit for distinguishing the practices of science and technology because the role of tacit knowledge in science may well be more important than cur- rent philosophy of science acknowledges, for example in concluding causal relationships on the basis of empirical evidence. This was also an important theme in the writings of Thomas Kuhn on scientific theory change.

To claim, with Skolimowski and Simon, that technology is about what is to be or what ought to be rather than what is may serve to distin- guish it from science but will hardly make it understandable why so much philosophical reflection on technology has taken the form of so- cio-cultural critique. Technology is an ongoing attempt to bring the world closer to the way one wishes it to be. Whereas science aims to understand the world as it is, technology aims to change the world. The- se are abstractions, of course. For one, whose wishes concerning what the world should be like are realized in technology? Unlike scientists, who are often personally motivated in their attempts at describing and understanding the world, engineers are seen, not in the least by engi- neers themselves, as undertaking their attempts to change the world as a service to the public. The ideas on what is to be or what ought to be are seen as originating outside of technology itself; engineers then take it upon themselves to realize these ideas. This view is a major source for the widely spread picture of technology as being instrumental, as deliv- ering instruments ordered from ‗elsewhere‘, as means to ends specified outside of engineering. This view involves a considerable distortion of

reality, however. Many engineers are intrinsically motivated to change the world; in delivering ideas for improvement they are, so to speak, their own best customers. The same is true for most industrial compa- nies, particularly in a market economy, where the prospect of great prof- its is another powerful motivator. As a result, much technological de- velopment is ‗technology-driven‘.

To understand where technology ‗comes from‘, what drives the in- novation process, is of importance not only to those who are curious to understand the phenomenon of technology itself but also to those who are concerned about its role in society. Technology is a practice focused on the creation of artifacts and, of increasing importance, artifact-based services. The design process, the structured process leading toward that goal, forms the core of the practice of technology. In the engineering literature, the design process is commonly represented as consisting of a series of translational steps; see for this e.g. Suh. At the start are the cus- tomer‘s needs or wishes. In the first step these are translated into a list of functional requirements, which then define the design task an engi- neer, or a team of engineers, has to accomplish. The functional require- ments specify as precisely as possible what the device to be designed must be able to do.

This step is required because customers usually focus on just one or two features and are unable to articulate the requirements that are neces- sary to support the functionality they desire. In the second step, the functional requirements are translated into design specifications, which the exact physical parameters of crucial components by which the func- tional requirements are going to be met. The design parameters are combined and amended such that a blueprint of the device results. The blueprint contains all the details that must be known such that the final step to the process of manufacturing the device can take place. It is tempting to consider the blueprint as the end result of a design process, instead of a finished copy being this result. However, actual copies of a device are crucial for the purpose of prototyping and testing. Prototyp- ing and testing presuppose that the sequence of steps making up the de- sign process can and will often contain iterations, leading to revisions of the design parameters and/or the functional requirements.

Even though, certainly for mass-produced items, the manufacture of a product for delivery to its customers or to the market comes after the closure of the design phase, the manufacturing process is often reflected in the functional requirements of a device, for example in putting re-

strictions on the number of different components of which the device consists. Ease of maintenance is often a functional requirement as well. An important modern development is that the complete life cycle of an artifact is now considered to be the designing engineer‘s concern, up till the final stages of the recycling and disposal of its components and ma- terials, and the functional requirements of any device should reflect this. From this point of view, neither a blueprint nor a prototype can be con- sidered the end product of engineering design.

The biggest idealization that this scheme of the design process con- tains is arguably located at the start. Only in a minority of cases does a design task originate in a customer need or wish for a particular artifact. First of all, as already suggested, many design tasks are defined by en- gineers themselves, for instance, by noticing something to be improved in existing products. But more often than not design starts with a prob- lem pointed out by some societal agent, which engineers are then invited to solve. Many such problems, however, are ill-defined or wicked prob- lems, meaning that it is not at all clear what the problem is exactly and what a solution to the problem would consist in.

The ‗problem‘ is a situation that people – not necessarily the people

‗in‘ the situation – find unsatisfactory, but typically without being able to specify a situation that they find more satisfactory in other terms than as one in which the problem has been solved. In particular it is not obvi- ous that a solution to the problem would consist in some artifact, or some artifactual system or process, being made available or installed. Engineering departments all over the world advertise that engineering is problem solving, and engineers easily seem confident that they are best qualified to solve a problem when they are asked to, whatever the nature of the problem. What is more, politics has tended to support engineers in this attitude. This has led to the phenomenon of a technological fix, the solution of a problem by a technical solution, that is, the delivery of an artifact or artifactual process, where it is questionable, to say the least, whether this solves the problem or whether it was the best way of han- dling the problem. An candidate example of a technological fix for the problem of global warming would be the currently much debated option of injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to offset the warming effect of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane. See for a discussion of technological fixing e.g. Given this situation, and its hazards, the notion of a problem and a taxonomy of problems deserve to receive more philosophical attention than they have hitherto received.

These wicked problems are often broadly social problems, which would best be met by some form of social interference. In defense of the engineering view, it could perhaps be said that the repertoire of ‗proven‘ ways of social interference is meager. The temptation of technical fixes could be overcome – at least that is how an engineer would see it – by the inclusion of the social sciences in the systematic development and application of knowledge to the solution of human problems. This how- ever, is a controversial view. Social engineering is to many a specter to be kept at as large a distance as possible instead of an ideal to be pur- sued. Karl Popper referred to acceptable forms of implementing social change as ‗piecemeal social engineering‘ and contrasted it to the revolu- tionary but completely unfounded schemes advocated by, e.g., Marxism. In this encyclopedia‘s entry on Karl Popper, however, his choice of words is called ‗rather unfortunate‘. This topic also deserves more atten- tion that it seems to be currently receiving.

An important input for the design process is scientific knowledge: knowledge about the behavior of components and the materials they are composed of in specific circumstances. This is the point where science is applied. However, much of this knowledge is not directly available from the sciences, since it often concerns extremely detailed behavior in very specific circumstances. This scientific knowledge is therefore often generated within technology, by the engineering sciences. But apart from this very specific scientific knowledge, engineering design in- volves various other sorts of knowledge. In his book What engineers know and how they know it, the aeronautical engineer Walter Vincenti gave a six-fold categorization of engineering design knowledge (leaving aside production and operation as the other two basic constituents of engineering practice).

Although the notion of an operational principle – a term that seems to originate with Polanyi – is central to engineering design, no single clear-cut definition of it seems to exist. The issue of disentangling de- scriptive from prescriptive aspects in an analysis of the technical action and its constituents is therefore a task that has hardly begun. This task requires a clear view on the extent and scope of technology. If one fol- lows Joseph Pitt in his book Thinking about technology and defines technology broadly as ‗humanity at work‘, then to distinguish between technological action and action in general becomes difficult, and the study of technological action must absorb all descriptive and normative theories of action, including the theory of practical rationality, and much

of theoretical economics in its wake. There have indeed been attempts at such an encompassing account of human action, for example Tadeusz Kotarbinski‘s Praxiology, but a perspective of such generality makes it difficult to arrive at results of sufficient depth. It would be a challenge for philosophy to specify the differences among action forms and the reasoning grounding them in, to single out three prominent practices, technology, organization and management, and economics.

A more restricted attempt at such an approach is Ilkka Niiniluoto‘s. According to Niiniluoto, the theoretical framework of technology as the practice that is concerned with what the world should be like rather than is, the framework that forms the counterpoint to the descriptive frame- work of science, is design science. The content of design science, the counterpoint to the theories and explanations that form the content of descriptive science, would then be formed by technical norms, state- ments of the form ‗If one wants to achieve X, one should do Y‘. The notion of a technical norm derives from Georg Henrik von Wright‘s Norm and action. Technical norms need to be distinguished from anankastic statements expressing natural necessity, of the form ‗If X is to be achieved, Y needs to be done‘; the latter have a truth value but the former have not. Von Wright himself, however, wrote that he did not understand the mutual relations between these statements. Ideas on what design science is and can and should be are evidently related to the broad problem area of practical rationality – see this encyclopedia‘s entries on practical reason and instrumental rationality – and also to means-ends reasoning, discussed in the next section.