Dialectical materialism, a philosophical approach to reality derived from the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For Marx and Engels, materialism meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses, has objective reality independent of mind or spirit. They did not deny the reality of mental or spiritual processes but affirmed that ideas could arise, therefore, only as products and reflections of material condi- tions. Marx and Engels understood materialism as the opposite of ideal- ism, by which they meant any theory that treats matter as dependent on mind or spirit, or mind or spirit as capable of existing independently of matter. For them, the materialist and idealist views were irreconcilably opposed throughout the historical development of philosophy. They adopted a thoroughgoing materialist approach, holding that any attempt to combine or reconcile materialism with idealism must result in confu- sion and inconsistency.
Marx‘s and Engels‘ conception of dialectics owes much to G.W.F. Hegel. In opposition to the ―metaphysical‖ mode of thought, which viewed things in abstraction, each by itself and as though endowed with fixed properties, Hegelian dialectics considers things in their move- ments and changes, interrelations and interactions. Everything is in con- tinual process of becoming and ceasing to be, in which nothing is per- manent but everything changes and is eventually superseded. All things contain contradictory sides or aspects, whose tension or conflict is the driving force of change and eventually transforms or dissolves them. But whereas Hegel saw change and development as the expression of the world spirit, or Idea, realizing itself in nature and in human society, for Marx and Engels change was inherent in the nature of the material world. They therefore held that one could not, as Hegel tried, deduce the actual course of events from any ―principles of dialectics‖; the princi- ples must be inferred from the events.
The theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels started from the mate- rialist premise that all knowledge is derived from the senses. But against the mechanist view that derives knowledge exclusively from given sense impressions, they stressed the dialectical development of human knowledge, socially acquired in the course of practical activity. Individ- uals can gain knowledge of things only through their practical interac- tion with those things, framing their ideas corresponding to their prac- tice; and social practice alone provides the test of the correspondence of idea with reality – i.e., of truth. This theory of knowledge is opposed equally to the subjective idealism according to which individuals can know only sensible appearances while things-in-themselves are elusive, and to the objective idealism according to which individuals can know supersensible reality by pure intuition or thought, independent of sense.
The concept of dialectical materialism – which is a theoretical basis for a method of reasoning – should not be confused with ―historical ma- terialism,‖ which is the Marxist interpretation of history in terms of the class struggle. There exists no systematic exposition of dialectical mate- rialism by Marx and Engels, who stated their philosophical views main- ly in the course of polemics.
Hegel and Marx developed a new form of thinking and Logic, which he called speculative reason to try to overcome what he saw as the limi- tations of both common sense and of traditional philosophy at grasping philosophical problems and the relation between thought and reality. His method was to begin with ultra-basic concepts, and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations towards solutions that take the form of series of concepts. He employed the tried-and-tested process of dialectic, but asserted that this logical process was not just a matter of form as separate from content, but had applications and repercussions in the real world. He also took the concept of the dialectic one step fur- ther, arguing that the new synthesis is not the final truth of the matter, but rather became the new thesis with its corresponding antithesis and synthesis. This process would continue effectively ad infitum, until reaching the ultimate synthesis, which is what Hegel called the Absolute Idea.
Hegel's main philosophical project, then, was to take the contradic- tions and tensions he saw throughout modern philosophy, culture and society, and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, ration- al unity that, in different contexts, he called "the absolute idea" or "abso- lute knowledge". He believed that everything was interrelated and that
the separation of reality into discrete parts was wrong. He advocated a kind of historically-minded Absolute Idealism, in which the universe would realize its spiritual potential through the development of human society, and in which mind and nature can be seen as two abstractions of one indivisible whole Spirit.
However, the traditional triadic dialectical interpretation of Hegel's approach (thesis - antithesis - synthesis) is perhaps too simplistic. From Hegel's point of view, analysis of any apparently simple identity or uni- ty reveals underlying inner contradictions, and it is these contradictions that lead to the dissolution of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented itself, and its development into a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more adequately incorporates the contradic- tions.
Hegel was the first major philosopher to regard history and the Phi- losophy of History as important. Hegel's Historicism is the position that all human societies are defined by their history, and that their essence can be sought only through understanding that. According to Hegel, to understand why a person is the way he is, you must put that person in a society; and to understand that society, you must understand its history, and the forces that shaped it. He is famously quoted as claiming that "Philosophy is the history of philosophy".
His system for understanding history, and the world itself, was de- veloped from his famous dialectic teachings of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. He saw history as as a progression, always moving forward, never static, in which each successive movement emerges as a solution to the contradictions inherent in the preceding movement. He believed that every complex situation contains within itself conflicting elements, which work to destabilize the situation, leading it to breakdown into a new situation in which the conflicts are resolved. Thus, the history of any human endeavour not only builds upon, but also reacts against, what has gone before. This process, though, is an ongoing one, because the resulting synthesis has itself inherent contradictions which need to be resolved. Crucially, however, Hegel believed that this dialectical pro- cess was not just random, but that it had a direction or a goal, and that goal was freedom and of the absolute knowledge of mind as the ultimate reality.
Synergetics deals with cognition and explanation of complex struc- tures, principles of their self-organization, generation of order from cha- os, evolution and co-evolution. Synergetics as an interdisciplinary re-
search field has far going applications to understanding of human being and development of social systems.
Synergetics as a field of scientific research has existed for over thirty years already. The term «synergetics» was introduced by the German scholar, Prof. H.Haken. It is widely used, but still not generally accept- ed. Instead, «theory of self-organization» is used as a more traditional term. In the last years two other terms «studies in complexity» and
«theory of chaos» became widely circulated. Sometimes they are used as identical with the former two, and sometimes only partly overlap with them.
Synergetics can be considered as a modern stage of development within the traditions of cybernetic and system-structural analysis. How- ever, many elements of the latter have undergone further essential reformation. While cybernetics investigates the functioning of complex systems using an abstract model of «black box», synergetics studies some physical mechanisms of the complex structures formation, i.e. it tries to look into the «black box». While cybernetics elaborates algo- rithms and methods of control of systems, synergetics investigates the processes of self-controlling and self-organization of complex systems in the world.
The focus of synergetic research program is to reveal some general laws of self-organization and evolution which are common to processes of quite different nature: physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social. As such synergetics contains an open trend towards universaliza- tion and directly borders on philosophy whose aim is to deal with the ultimate features and laws of reality. General line of synergetic research consists mostly of two elements: from a concrete, but fundamental mod- el of processes to interdisciplinary generalizations and back to concrete subject with its rectified theoretical understanding. Accordingly, syner- getics functions as applied synergetics and synergetics proper.
The whole history of development of the theory of self-organization shows that significant theoretical generalizations appeared from rather narrow, but fundamental scientific results. The non-equilibrium thermo- dynamics and the theory of dissipative structures developed by the Brussels school of the Nobel Prize winner I.Prigogine had its back- ground in investigation of processes in physical chemistry.
The development of the theory of cooperative behaviour, made by
H. Haken and called by him self synergetics proper, originated from the investigations of the coherent radiation of lasers. Lasers became a para-
digmatic example of synergetics. H.Haken is an editor of a Springer se- ries of books on synergetics presenting a whole spectrum of synergetic developments in the world. As one of other examples of natural science stating point of for further generalizations up to a worldview one can mention the investigation of nonlinear auto-waves as early as in the 1930′s by the Russian school of L.I. Mandelshtam and A. Andronov.
Some astonishing results have been obtained recently by the Moscow synergetic school at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics led by S.P. Kurdyumov with whom I have been collaborating for more then 10 years. The basic model is here a certain class of nonlinear equations describing evolutionary processes of burning in very fast, so-called blow-up, regimes in dissipative media. The model implies a profound sense. Some general features of the complex systems behaviour are be- ing revealed, namely: mechanisms of localization processes in open dis- sipative media, spectra of structure-attractors as the most stable for- mations which evolutionary processes in such media go to; methods of resonant excitation of structure-attractors; way of a complex whole con- struction from parts developing with different speeds.
It‘s worth mentioning some other trends in the studies of complexity, chaos and self-organization. E. Laszlo, President of the International Society for the Systems Sciences and a Member of the Club of Rome, is involved in finding ways of a transdisciplinary unified theory construc- tion. The American scholar B. Mandelbrot elaborates the so-called theo- ry of deterministic chaos, various scenarios of transition to chaos and back. The Chilian biologists H. Maturana and F.Varela introduced the notion of autopoiesis which, in their opinion, describes a fundamental ability of living beings to permanently maintain their organization and to develop. F.Varela is working now in Paris and develops the theory of autopoiesis and its application to the human brain activities. The other scholar working in Paris E.Morin, a founder of Association of Complex Thinking, has undertaken profound analyses of the very language of complexity and chaos. There are many other researchers fruitfully work- ing in the fields. All these trends are coloured in specific tones of the original disciplines, e.g. mathematics, physics, chemistry or biology.
Synergetics reveals the creative role of chaos in the process of origin of complex structures and their evolution. Chaos and fluctuations on micro-level play an essential role in determining actual trends, «aims» of processes at a macro-level. Chaos manifests itself as a mechanism underlying an exit to one of evolutionary structure-attractors. The mac-
ro-organization evolves from a disorder, chaos on micro-level. Dissipa- tive processes, which are a macroscopic revelation of micro-chaos, act in the same way as a sculptor‘s chisel shapes a statue from a block of marble.
One of the most essential questions is that of the trends of evolution: where do evolutionary processes go to? How does history flow on? The future states of complex systems escape our control and prediction. The future is open, not unequivocal. But at the same time, the spectra of
«purposes» of development are available in open nonlinear systems. If we choose an arbitrary way of evolution, we have to be aware that the way may be not feasible in a given system. Only a definite set of evolu- tionary ways, evolutionary structure-attractors can develop. Figuratively speaking, there is «a tacit knowledge» of the system itself. The spectra are determined exclusively by the inner properties of open nonlinear systems. Thus, the future is open in the form of spectra of pre- determined possibilities.
Complexity is closely connected with speed of evolution. A complex structure is an integration of structures of «different ages», i.e. structures at different evolutionary stages of development. The principles of inte- gration of such structures of «different ages» into an evolutionary whole structure are being revealed in synergetics. The integration of relatively simple structures into a more complex one occurs through the estab- lishment of a common tempo of development in all unified parts. Struc- tures of «different ages» start to co-exist in one and the same ‗tempo- world‘. The term ‗tempo-world‘ proposed here signifies ‗a world having a certain rate of development‘. Rate of development is the most im- portant characteristic in the process of assembling of a complex evolu- tionary whole.
Synergetics goes beyond the framework of strict mathematical mod- els and narrow applications. Scholars are trying now to apply synerget- ics not only to new fields of natural sciences, but also to the humanities. There are some attempts to use synergetic models in understanding hu- man artistic and scientific creativity, cognition, health, education, com- munication, humankind development, etc. Although it is very difficult to use synergetic models here in a quantitative way, a general qualitative synergetic view allow us to reveal some unusual features of the human individual and his collective life.
Synergetics is optimistic in its essence. In the modern situation of ac- celerated and unstable development of the world, synergetics brings us
new hopes. It is an optimistic attempt to understand the principles of co- evolution of the complex social systems, to reveal causes of evolution- ary crises, instability and chaos and to master the methods of nonlinear management of complex systems in unstable states. How to manage a complex system without harsh management is the major problem. How can we push the system in a favourable evolutionary path with a small resonant influence? How can we provide a self-maintaining and sustain- able development? Synergetics can serve as a heuristic instrument in searches of answers to the questions.
The synergetic approach to a human being is a new approach to indi- vidual and collective health. Healing acquires a metaphorical image of
«self-opening», «returning to self». It is a kind of «synergetic adven- ture» of a human being when the latent attitudes to a favourable and healthy future are being revealed in the human. It is discovering some self-maintaining paths and inner forces to follow them. From a synerget- ic point of view it is possible to discuss the following questions: Is it healthy to be chaotic? What are the causes of the efficiency of weak in- fluences such as homeopathic or acupunctural? Is it possible to be psy- chically healthy and to have simultaneously a somatic disease?
The synergetic approach to education, synergetics of education, can be characterized as a gestalt-education. The procedure of education, a way of connection between a teacher and a pupil, is not a transfer of knowledge from one head to another. It is neither an enlightenment nor rendering of some already discovered truths. This is a nonlinear situa- tion of an open dialogue with an intermediate feedback, a joint educa- tional adventure. This is falling – in course of solving some problems – into one and the same self-concordant tempo-world. The latter means that due to common activity the teacher and the pupil begin to develop with the same rate.
The educational procedure consists simply in awakening of the forc- es and abilities of a given pupil and in stimulating progress on his or her own paths of development. The gestalt-education is an initiating educa- tion, reopening of ourselves, collaboration with ourselves and with other people. It is a way to discover the reality as well as to search paths into the future.
7.1.13. Philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge
Epistemology, the study of the theory of knowledge, is among the most important areas of philosophy. The questions that it addresses in- clude the following:
The first problem encountered in epistemology is that of defining knowledge. Much of the time, philosophers use the tripartite theory of knowledge, which analyses knowledge as justified true belief, as a working model. The tripartite theory has, however, been refuted: Gettier cases show that some justified true beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Rival analyses of knowledge have been proposed, but there is as yet no consensus on what knowledge is. This fundamental question of episte- mology remains unsolved.
Though philosophers are unable to provide a generally accepted analysis of knowledge, we all understand roughly what we are talking about when we use words such as ―knowledge‖. Thankfully, this means that it is possible to get on with epistemology, leaving unsolved the fun- damental question as to what knowledge is.
A second important issue in epistemology concerns the ultimate source of our knowledge. There are two traditions: empiricism, which holds that our knowledge is primarily based in experience, and rational- ism, which holds that our knowledge is primarily based in reason. Alt- hough the modern scientific worldview borrows heavily from empiri- cism, there are reasons for thinking that a synthesis of the two traditions is more plausible than either of them individually.
There are better and worse ways to form beliefs. In general terms, it is important to consider evidence when deciding what to believe, be- cause by doing so we are more likely to form beliefs that are true. Pre- cisely how this should work, when we are justified in believing some- thing and when we are not, is another topic in the theory of knowledge. The three most prominent theories of epistemic justification are founda- tionalism, coherentism, and reliabilism.
Much of our knowledge, it seems, does come to us through our sens- es, through perception. Perception, though, is a complex process. The way that we experience the world may be determined in part by the world, but it is also determined in part by us. We do not passively re- ceive information through our senses; arguably, we contribute just as much to our experiences as do the objects that they are experiences of. How we are to understand the process of perception, and how this
should effect our understanding of the world that we inhabit, is therefore vital for epistemology.
The area of epistemology that has captured most imaginations is philosophical scepticism. Alongside the questions of what knowledge is and how we come to acquire it is the question whether we do in fact know anything at all. There is a long philosophical tradition that says that we do not, and the arguments in support of this position, though resisted by most, are remarkably difficult to refute. The most persistent problem in the theory of knowledge is not what knowledge is or what it comes from, but whether there is any such thing at all.
Cognitive Psychology is a branch of psychology dealing with the 'cognitive' aspects of mind: perception, attention, categorization, memory, learning, language use, reasoning, and decision-making. As a branch of psychology, cognitive psychology typically focuses on the human mind. Unlike the psychological behaviorists, cognitive psy- chologists want to know the underlying, 'internal' mechanisms that brings about these cognitie phenomena. Thus, cognitive psychologists are not just interested in cataloging human cognitive performance under various conditions, but try to explain such cognitive performance by postulating and testing models of these mechanisms. Cognitive psychol- ogy is therefore very much an empirical science.
Philosophical logic deals with formal descriptions of ordinary, non- specialist language, that is strictly only about the arguments within phi- losophy's other branches. Most philosophers assume that the bulk of everyday reasoning can be captured in logic if a method or methods to translate ordinary language into that logic can be found. Philosophical logic is essentially a continuation of the traditional discipline called "logic" before the invention of mathematical logic. Philosophical logic has a much greater concern with the connection between natural lan- guage and logic. As a result, philosophical logicians have contributed a great deal to the development of non-standard logics as well as various extensions of classical logic and non-standard semantics for such logics.
Logic and the philosophy of language are closely related. Philosophy of language has to do with the study of how our language engages and interacts with our thinking. Logic has an immediate impact on other are- as of study. Studying logic and the relationship between logic and ordi- nary speech can help a person better structure his own arguments and critique the arguments of others. Many popular arguments are filled
with errors because so many people are untrained in logic and unaware of how to formulate an argument correctly.
There were a number of views of truth under discussion at that time, the most significant for the contemporary literature being the corre- spondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth. These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question: what is the nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, and the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering this ques- tion, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology. Explaining the nature of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way.
The goal of this section is to characterize the ideas of the corre- spondence, coherence and pragmatist theories which animate the con- temporary debate. In some cases, the received forms of these theories depart from the views that were actually defended in the early 20th cen- tury. We thus dub them the ‗neo-classical theories‘. Where appropriate, we pause to indicate how the neo-classical theories emerge from their
‗classical‘ roots in the early 20th century.
Perhaps the most important of the neo-classical theories for the con- temporary literature is the correspondence theory. Ideas that sound strik- ingly like a correspondence theory are no doubt very old. They might well be found in Aristotle or Aquinas. When we turn to the late 19th and early 20th centuries where we pick up the story of the neo-classical the- ories of truth, it is clear that ideas about correspondence were central to the discussions of the time. In spite of their importance, however, it is strikingly difficult to find an accurate citation in the early 20th century for the received neo-classical view. Furthermore, the way the corre- spondence theory actually emerged will provide some valuable refer- ence points for the contemporary debate. For these reasons, we dwell on the origins of the correspondence theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at greater length than those of the other neo-classical views, before turning to its contemporary neo-classical form.
The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts. This idea can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Its modern history starts with the beginnings of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the work of G.
E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.
Let us pick up the thread of this story in the years between 1898 and about 1910. These years are marked by Moore and Russell's rejection of idealism. Yet at this point, they do not hold a correspondence theory of truth. Indeed Moore sees the correspondence theory as a source of ideal- ism, and rejects it. Russell follows Moore in this regard. In this period, Moore and Russell hold a version of the identity theory of truth. They say comparatively little about it, but it is stated briefly in Moore and Russell. According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. Specifically, in Moore and Russell's hands, the the- ory begins with propositions, understood as the objects of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Propositions are what are believed, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, and a belief in that proposition is correct.
The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a property of propositions. Furthermore, taking up an idea familiar to readers of Moore, the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable proper- ty. Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propo- sitions. They do so because they came to reject the existence of proposi- tions. Why? Among reasons, they came to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and then concluded that there are no such things as propositions at all.
Why did Moore and Russell find false propositions problematic? A full answer to this question is a point of scholarship that would take us too far afield. But very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them unable to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false propositions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false propositions. As Russell later says, propositions seem to be at best ―curious shadowy things‖ in addition to facts.
As Cartwright reminds us, it is useful to think of this argument in the context of Russell's slightly earlier views about propositions. As we see clearly in Russell, for instance, he takes propositions to have constitu- ents. But they are not mere collections of constituents, but a ‗unity‘ which brings the constituents together. But what, we might ask, would be the ‗unity‘ of a proposition that Samuel Ramey sings – with constitu-
ents Ramey and singing – except Ramey bearing the property of sing- ing? If that is what the unity consists in, then we seem to have nothing other than the fact that Ramey sings. But then we could not have genu- ine false propositions without having false facts.
Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its develop- ers as a competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to the coherence theory of truth. We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory than we were with the correspondence theory. Like the correspondence theory, versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philosophy. Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Rus- sell were reacting.
Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim Joachim says that. Truth in its essential na- ture is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole.
We will not attempt a full exposition of Joachim's view, which would take us well beyond the discussion of truth into the details of British idealism. But a few remarks about his theory will help to give substance to the quoted passage.
The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coher- ence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of jus- tification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a co- herent system of beliefs. An argument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the co- herence theory of truth. The steps in this argument may be questioned by a number of contemporary epistemological views. But the coherence theory also goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have al- ready discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joa- chim, and later by Blanshard. An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will
see little room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.
It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism. If there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in an appropriate system of beliefs, then it would seem one's beliefs constitute the world in a way that amounts to idealism. The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it.
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American prag- matists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theo- ries, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:
Truth is satisfactory to believe. James understands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. Likewise, Peirce's slogan tells us that true beliefs will remain settled at the end of prolonged inquiry. Peirce's slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neo-classical the- ory. However, the contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received ‗neo-classical‘ pragmatist theory.
Fundamental research
Basic research, also called pure research or fundamental research, is scientific research aimed to improve scientific theories for improved understanding or prediction of natural or other phenomena. Applied re- search, in turn, uses scientific theories to develop technology or tech- niques to intervene and alter natural or other phenomena. Though often driven by curiosity, basic research fuels applied science's innovations. The two aims are often coordinated in research and development.
Although many discoveries have been serendipitous, discovery sci- ence specifically seeks discoveries, and, along with theoretical science
and experimental science, is now key to basic research and is sometimes expressly planned.
Basic research advances fundamental knowledge about the world. It focuses on refuting or supporting theories that explain observed phe- nomena. Pure research is the source of most new scientific ideas and ways of thinking about the world. It can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory; however, explanatory research is the most common. Basic research generates new ideas, principles, and theories, which may not be immediately utilized but none theless form the basis of progress and development in different fields. Today's computers, for example, could not exist without research in pure mathematics conducted over a century ago, for which there was no known practical application at the time. Basic research rarely helps practitioners directly with their everyday concerns; nevertheless, it stimulates new ways of thinking that have the potential to revolutionize and dramatically improve how practitioners deal with a problem in the future. In the United States, basic research is funded mainly by federal government and done mainly at universities and institutes. As government funding has diminished in the 2010s, however, private funding is increasingly important.
Applied science focuses on the development of technology and tech- niques. In contrast, basic science develops scientific knowledge and predictions, principally in natural sciences but also in other empirical sciences, which are used as the scientific foundation for applied science. Basic science develops and establishes information to predict phenome- na and perhaps to understand nature, whereas applied science uses por- tions of basic science to develop interventions via technology or tech- nique to alter events or outcomes. Applied and basic sciences can inter- face closely in research and development. The interface between basic research and applied research has been studied by the National Science Foundation. It conducted a study in which it traced the relationship be- tween basic scientific research efforts and the development of major innovations, such as oral contraceptives and videotape recorders.
Their study found that basic research played a key role in the devel- opment in all of the innovations. The number of basic science research that assisted in the production of a given innovation peaked between 20 and 30 years before the innovation itself. While most innovation takes the form of applied science and most innovation occurs in the private sector, basic research is a necessary precursor to almost all applied sci-
ence and associated instances of innovation. Roughly 76% of basic re- search is conducted by universities.
A distinction can be made between basic science and disciplines such as medicine and technology. They can be grouped as STM. These groups are interrelated and influence each other, although they may dif- fer in the specifics such as methods and standards.
The Nobel Prize mixes basic with applied sciences for its award in Physiology or Medicine. In contrast, the Royal Society of Lon- don awards distinguish natural science from applied science.
Applied research
Applied research is a form of systematic inquiry involving the practi- cal application of science. It accesses and uses some part of the research communities' accumulated theories, knowledge, methods, and tech- niques, for a specific, often state-, business-, or client-driven purpose. Applied research is contrasted with pure research in discussion about research ideals, methodologies, programs, and projects. Applied re- search deals with solving practical problems and generally employs em- pirical methodologies. Because applied research resides in the messy real world, strict research protocols may need to be relaxed. For exam- ple, it may be impossible to use a random sample. Thus, transparency in the methodology is crucial. Implications for interpretation of results brought about by relaxing an otherwise strict canon of methodology should also be considere. Since Applied Research has a provisional close to the problem and close to the data orientation it may also use a more provisional conceptual framework such as working hypothesis or pillar questions. The OECD's Frascati Manual describes Applied Re- search as one of the three forms of research, along with Basic research & Experimental Development.
Due to its practical focus, applied research information will be found in the literature associated with individual disciplines. The military is an organization that performs a lot of applied research. For example, they may want to know about the efficacy of soldier training, how well re- cruitment practices work, how best to deal with host nationals in times of war, how to use the internet to reduce home grown terrorists, and the effectiveness of operational styles.
7.1.16. Methodology of the research activity
Methodology is the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study. It comprises the theoretical analysis of the body of methods and principles associated with a branch of knowledge. Typically, it encompasses concepts such as paradigm, theoretical model, phases and quantitative or qualitative techniques.
A methodology does not set out to provide solutions - it is, therefore, not the same as a method. Instead, a methodology offers the theoretical underpinning for understanding which method, set of methods, or best practices can be applied to specific case, for example, to calculate a spe- cific result. It has been defined also as follows:
1. the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline;
2. the systematic study of methods that are, can be, or have been applied within a discipline
3. the description of methods.
The methodology is the general research strategy that outlines the way in which research is to be undertaken and, among other things, identifies the methods to be used in it. These methods, described in the methodology, define the means or modes of data collection or, some- times, how a specific result is to be calculated. Methodology does not define specific methods, even though much attention is given to the na- ture and kinds of processes to be followed in a particular procedure or to attain an objective.
When proper to a study of methodology, such processes constitute a constructive generic framework, and may therefore be broken down into sub-processes, combined, or their sequence changed.
A paradigm is similar to a methodology in that it is also a construc- tive framework. In theoretical work, the development of paradigms sat- isfies most or all of the criteria for methodology. An algorithm, like a paradigm, is also a type of constructive framework, meaning that the construction is a logical, rather than a physical, array of connected ele- ments. Any description of a means of calculation of a specific result is always a description of a method and never a description of a methodol- ogy. It is thus important to avoid using methodology as a synonym for method or body of methods. Doing this shifts it away from its true epis- temological meaning and reduces it to being the procedure itself, or the set of tools, or the instruments that should have been its outcome. A methodology is the design process for carrying out research or the de-
velopment of a procedure and is not in itself an instrument, or method, or procedure for doing things.
Methodology and method are not interchangeable. In recent years however, there has been a tendency to use methodologyas a "pretentious substitute for the word method. Using methodology as a synonym for method or set of methods leads to confusion and misinterpretation and undermines the proper analysis that should go into designing research.
Innovation activities
Innovation are all scientific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial steps which actually, or are intended to, lead to the im- plementation of innovations. Some innovation activities are themselves innovative, others are not novel activities but are necessary for the im- plementation of innovations. Innovation activities also include research and development that is not directly related to the development of a spe- cific innovation. A common feature of an innovation is that it must have been implemented. A new or improved product is implemented when it is introduced on the market. New processes, marketing methods or or- ganisational methods are implemented when they are brought into actual use in the firm's operations.
Innovation activities vary greatly in their nature from firm to firm. Some firms engage in well-defined innovation projects, such as the de- velopment and introduction of a new product, whereas others primarily make continuous improvements to their products, processes and opera- tions. Both types of firms can be innovative: an innovation can consist of the implementation of a single significant change, or of a series of smaller incremental changes that together constitute a significant change.
Дата: 2019-07-24, просмотров: 313.
