By Richard N. Haass

Should nuclear weapons be abolished? To many, the answer might seem obvious given the economic cost and, more important, the destructive power of these weapons. The use of just a small percentage of the tens of thousands of weapons that exist could kill millions of people and leave large areas of the Earth uninhabitable for generations.
For better or worse, however, the question of abolishing nuclear weapons is actually quite complicated. Nevertheless, the best answer to the question of whether they should be abolished in the foreseeable future turns out to be “no.”
History bolsters this perspective. The Cold War waged by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the latter half of the 20th century remained “cold” in large part because of nuclear weapons. Although there were some close calls, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, each side correctly calculated that no gain was worth the risk of a nuclear war that would have left both countries and much of the world completely demolished. This fear of nuclear war led the leadership of the two superpowers to act with great caution and avoid direct confrontation lest it escalate into nuclear catastrophe. The Cold War thus proved to be different in fundamental ways from other eras of history in which war between the dominant powers of the period was the norm.
However, the utility of nuclear weapons did not end with the demise of the Soviet Union and the fading of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons, which for decades helped keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula, continue to contribute to stability. North Korea, despite its massive conventional military might, has not launched an attack on South Korea. One reason for this apparent restraint is the knowledge that the United States has not ruled out using nuclear weapons on behalf of its ally if troops from the North were to threaten to overrun the South.
Nuclear weapons and the possibility that they might be used may also have contributed to Iraqi restraint during the 1991 Persian Gulf War triggered by Iraq’s August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In January 1991 U.S. president George Bush sent a letter to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein warning that any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons could prompt the United States to respond in the most powerful ways imaginable, a warning the Iraqis took to mean nuclear weapons. It is highly possible that because of this reason Iraq never used its chemical or biological weapons against troops from the international coalition, which included the United States. Iraq had used chemical weapons in a previous war against Iran in the 1980s.
The experience with Iraq during Operation Desert Storm points out that nuclear weapons have increasingly taken on an additional role: to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons. The United States no longer has the option of deterring the use of chemical or biological weapons by threatening to retaliate in kind, because it no longer possesses such weapons. The threat of nuclear retaliation could discourage the use of these other terrible weapons. At the same time the actual use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack could dissuade others from following suit.
Israel provides another example of nuclear weapon possession used successfully as a deterrent. Israel is widely known to possess nuclear weapons, although its government does not acknowledge this fact. It is plausible that Israel’s de facto nuclear weapons status may have helped convince people and governments throughout the Arab world that the Jewish state was here to stay and could not be eliminated even if Arab armies proved victorious on the conventional, nonnuclear battlefield. Negotiations began to gain momentum once it became clear there would be no military solution to the challenge posed by Israel.
A last possible example of a situation in which nuclear weapons may have contributed to stability involves India and Pakistan. India first exploded what it described as a “peaceful nuclear device” in 1974; Pakistan, while avoiding a test at the time, also developed a nuclear weapon. Both countries tested nuclear devices in 1998. It is noteworthy that the Indo-Pakistani rivalry (which often includes small conventional clashes) has not spilled over into all-out war, something that did occur several times in the pre-nuclear weapons era. As was the case between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China, nuclear weapons appear to be useful as a means of deterring not simply nuclear war but all forms of war between nuclear-armed countries.
None of these claims is meant to suggest there are no risks or costs associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. One direct cost, the financial one, is considerable. A 1999 study published by the Brookings Institution notes that the United States alone spent approximately $5.5 trillion (measured in 1996 dollars) on nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related programs from 1940 to 1996. This adds up to nearly $100 billion a year on average.
A second potential cost of nuclear weapons might be described as a copycat effect. Many experts argue that the decision by the five major nuclear powers—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to hold on to their weapons increases the temptation for others to become weapons states themselves. This is plausible in selected cases such as India, where some officials in that country advocated a nuclear weapons program to deter China. But there is a long list of countries—such as Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine—who have either given up nuclear weapons programs or decided not to develop or acquire them. Domestic politics and relations with neighbors and rivals seem to weigh more in this decision than trying to emulate the existing nuclear powers for reasons such as national prestige. What is more, the fact that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and is prepared, in principle, to use them to deter threats to its allies—a phenomenon known as extended deterrence—actually reduces the pressure on certain countries to develop their own nuclear weapons capability.
Still, it would be unwise to assume that such weapons will forever remain unused simply because individuals and governments have exercised restraint to date. If deterrence should break down for any reason, the human toll of any nuclear weapons use would be great. The bombs dropped by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final days of World War II (1939-1945) demonstrated the awful destructive power of what were two relatively small and primitive weapons. Today’s bombs are far more powerful and, if they were used, would therefore cause damage on a far greater scale.
Some of these risks and costs can be reduced. Inventories of nuclear weapons can and should be reduced. Even during the Cold War, arms control agreements managed to limit and to some extent reduce the levels of nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it should be possible to reduce U.S. and Russian inventories dramatically. Maintaining smaller forces would not only save money that would otherwise be devoted to modernization and maintenance but would also reduce the chance that weapons might somehow fall into the hands of terrorist organizations. The deployment of limited defensive antimissile systems can supplement arms control and deterrence by providing a measure of insurance against small nuclear attacks triggered by accident, unauthorized persons, or by so-called rogue actors such as North Korea or Iraq.
As several of these points suggest, it is no less important that nuclear weapons inventories, whatever their size, be maintained in a fashion that minimizes the chance for accidental or unauthorized use. This requires good intelligence and warning systems so those in charge of launching nuclear weapons do not react to false or flawed data. In addition, physically separating weapons from launch systems can provide valuable extra time in moments of crisis, to allow tempers to cool or for information to be clarified.
It is also essential that any nuclear weapons arsenal be sufficiently robust so as to discourage intentional use. This is what deterrence, or prevention, is all about. Deterring a nuclear war requires making sure that your adversaries know that they will not benefit from using nuclear weapons first. This, in turn, requires that all parties maintain “second strike” capabilities—that is, the ability to survive a nuclear attack and still retaliate so that the side striking first gains no advantage. Winston Churchill’s statement, “Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation” vividly captures this concept. Indeed, this idea of mutual vulnerability, or mutual assured destruction, is so central to deterrence that it was codified by the then-superpowers in a 1972 treaty that severely limited defense against ballistic missiles.
Would a world without nuclear weapons be more peaceful? Not necessarily. War was commonplace between and within states for the centuries of recorded history before the advent of the nuclear age. There is little reason to believe that human nature has progressed to the point where the traditional sources of conflict—ideology, nationalism, religion, greed, ambition—are even close to being obsolete. A nuclear weapons-free world would be better off in the sense that a cataclysmic conflict was no longer a possibility, but arguably worse off in the sense that lesser but still terrible forms of conflict would become less risky and hence more frequent.
Managing the transition to a world without nuclear weapons would be difficult, as even a small amount of cheating could have significance. In theory, a state that came to possess only a few nuclear weapons would enjoy a tremendous advantage over all others. Efforts aimed at preventing this would involve a degree of intrusive inspections and monitoring that is far beyond what many governments of today would tolerate. Moreover, abolition could not prevent the reemergence of nuclear weapons. Uninventing nuclear weapons is impossible. The knowledge of how to manufacture nuclear devices and advanced delivery systems such as aircraft and missiles cannot be extinguished. A race to reintroduce nuclear weapons would be filled with danger.
What would have to change for it to be both possible and safe to move to a nuclear weapons-free world? Nothing less than a basic transformation of international politics would be required. Tensions between governments would have to fade dramatically; trust between them would have to grow. Abolition of nuclear weapons in and of itself would not bring about an abolition of tension or conflict. To the contrary, it would lead to a world of more frequent violence if the restraining features of nuclear deterrence were removed and not replaced by better political relations.
Such consensus and sense of community is a long way off. For now, nuclear weapons are a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.

About the author: Richard N. Haass is vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He served on the National Security Council staff under the administration of President George Bush.

  Exercises:

Study the vocabulary

·  To leave large areas uninhabitable

· In the foreseeable future

· To bolster the perspective

· Close calls - a narrow escape from danger or disaster

· To leave something completely demolished

· To act with great caution

· To avoid direct confrontation

· The demise of something - [dımaız] failure or termination

· To overrun - spread over or occupy (a place) in large numbers

· To prompt to respond in the most powerful ways imaginable

· To retaliate - make an attack in return for a similar attack

· To dissuade others from following suit - If people follow suit, they do the same thing that someone else has just done.

· To be plausible - plausible (of an argument or statement) seeming reasonable or probable

· On the conventional battlefield

· No military solution posed by somebody

· To spill over in the all-out war

· A copycat effect - denoting an action, typically a crime, carried out in imitation of another

· To emulate – imitate

· Extended deterrence

· To date - until now

· The human toll - the number of deaths or casualties arising from a natural disaster, conflict, accident, etc

· Rogue actors -[rəug] a dishonest or unprincipled man

· To react to false or flawed data

· To allow tempers to cool

· To be robust - [rə'bʌst ]здравый, ясный

· Adversaries - ['ædvəs(ə)rɪ]) враг, противник, оппонент

· Sturdy -  не идущий на компромиссы; неуступчивый непреклонный, несгибаемый

· To be codified - arranging(laws or rules) into a systematic code

2. Prove using arguments that nuclear weapons shouldnot be abolished as the abolition would lead to a world of more frequent violence if the restraining features of nuclear deterrence were removed and not replaced by better political relations.

3. Dwell on the following:

- History bolsters saying “no” to abolishing nuclear weapons.

- Nuclear weapons, which for decades helped keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula, continue to contribute to stability

- Nuclear weapons and the possibility that they might be used may also have contributed to Iraqi restraint during the 1991 Persian Gulf war

- The experience with Iraq during Operation Desert storm points out that nuclear weapons have increasingly taken on an additional role: to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons

- Israel provides another example of nuclear possession used successfully as a deterrent

- India and Pakistan rivalry

- There are risks and costs associated with the possession of nuclear weapons

- Extended deterrence reduces the pressure on certain countries to develop their own nuclear weapons capability

- If deterrence should break down for any reason, the human toll of any nuclear weapons use would be great

- Inventories of nuclear weapons should be reduced

- Nuclear weapons inventories should be maintained in a fashion that minimizes the chance for accidental or unauthorized use

- It is also essential

- A world without nuclear weapons would not necessarily be peaceful

- Managing the transition to a world without nuclear weapons would be difficult

- Abolition could not prevent the reemergence of nuclear weapons

- Nothing less than a basic transformation of international politics would be required