Работа издана 2016 году. В ней рассматриваются актуальные философско-методологические и социально-экономические про- блемы построения общества инноваций: среда и факторы иннова- ционного развития, антикризисная стратегия, роль интеллектуаль- ного ресурса в виде науки и образования. Анализируется успешный десятилетний опыт инновационного развития Парка высоких тех- нологий Республики Беларусь: проектирование и построение инно- вационной инфраструктуры, приоритеты и формы модернизации и создание инновационной среды, IT – образование, венчурное фи- нансирование, стартап-движение и др.

7. ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ МАТЕРИАЛ ПО ФИЛОСОФИИ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ.

7.1. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR PHILOSOPHY

7.1.1. Philosophy: subject, purposes, problems

The Greek word «philosophy» means "love of wisdom". The aim is to train one's judgment through analysis, critique, and self-critique, to pay attention to distinctions and to see underlying patterns, and to see the whole beyond the parts. Philosophy is a systematic reflection on rea- son and reality; studies in philosophy will provide a good foundation for studying any other discipline, as well as for professions that requires analytical skills and a creative intellect.

Branch of the philosophy: metaphysics, anthropology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophe of science, philosophe of history, eth- ics, aesthetics, logic, philosophe of religion.

Philosophy and methodology of science study a philosophical per- spective evolution natural and social research. Discusses metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical issues related to the practice and goals of modern science. For treatment of philosophical issues raised by the problems and concepts of specific sciences, see biology, philosophy of; and physics, philosophy of.

The history of philosophy is intertwined with the history of the natu- ral science. Long before the 19th century, when the term sciencebegan to be used with its modern meaning, those who are now counted among the major figures in the history of Western philosophy were often equal- ly famous for their contributions to ―natural philosophy,‖ the bundle of inquiries now designated as sciences. Aristotle was the first great biolo- gist; René Descartes formulated analytic geometry and discovered the laws of the reflection and refraction of light; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz laid claim to priority in the invention of the calculus; and Immanuel Kant offered the basis of a still-current hypothesis regarding the for- mation of the solar system .

In reflecting on human knowledge, the great philosophers also of- fered accounts of the aims and methods of the sciences, ranging from Aristotle‘s studies in logic through the proposals of Francis Bacon and Descartes, which were instrumental in shaping 17th-century science. They were joined in these reflections by the most eminent natural scien- tists. Galileo supplemented his arguments about the motions of earthly and heavenly bodies with claims about the roles of mathematics and experiment in discovering facts about nature. Similarly, the account giv- en by Isaac Newton of his system of the natural world is punctuated by a defense of his methods and an outline of a positive program for scien- tific inquiry. Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, James Clerk Maxwell, Charles

Darwin, and Albert Einstein all continued this tradition, offering their own insights into the character of the scientific enterprise.

Although it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether to classify an older figure as a philosopher or a scientist – and, indeed, the archa- ic―natural philosopher‖ may sometimes seem to provide a good com- promise – since the early 20th century, philosophy of science has been more self-conscious about its proper role. Some philosophers continue to work on problems that are continuous with the natural sciences, ex- ploring, for example, the character of space and time or the fundamental features of life. They contribute to the philosophy of the special scienc- es, a field with a long tradition of distinguished work in the philosophy of physics and with more-recent contributions in the philosophy of biol- ogy and the philosophy of psychology and neuroscience. General phi- losophy of science, by contrast, seeks to illuminate broad features of the sciences, continuing the inquiries begun in Aristotle‘s discussions of logic and method.

A series of developments in early 20th-century philosophy made the general philosophy of science central to philosophy in the English- speaking world. Inspired by the articulation of mathematical logic, or formal logic, in the work of the philosophers Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russel and the mathematician David Hilbert, a group of European philosophers known as the Vienna Circle attempted to diag- nose the difference between the inconclusive debates that mark the his- tory of philosophy and the firm accomplishments of the sciences they admired. They offered criteria of meaningfulness, or ―cognitive signifi- cance,‖ aiming to demonstrate that traditional philosophical questions are meaningless. The correct task of philosophy, they suggested, is to formulate a ―logic of the sciences‖ that would be analogous to the logic of pure mathematics formulated by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert. In the light of logic, they thought, genuinely fruitful inquiries could be freed from the encumbrances of traditional philosophy.

To carry through this bold program, a sharp criterion of meaningful- ness was required. Unfortunately, as they tried to use the tools of math- ematical logic to specify the criterion, the logical positivists encountered unexpected difficulties. Again and again, promising proposals were ei- ther so lax that they allowed the cloudiest pronouncements of tradition- al metaphysics to count as meaningful, or so restrictive that they exclud- ed the most cherished hypotheses of the sciences. Logical positivism evolved into a more moderate movement, logical empiricism. Logical

empiricists took as central the task of understanding the distinctive vir- tues of the natural sciences. In effect, they proposed that the search for a theory of scientific method – undertaken by Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, and others – could be carried out more thoroughly with the tools of mathematical logic. Not only did they see a theory of scientific method as central to philosophy, but they also viewed that theory as valuable for aspiring areas of inquiry in which an explicit understanding of method might resolve debates and clear away confusions. Their agenda was deeply influential in subsequent philosophy of science.

An ideal theory of scientific method would consist of instructions that could lead an investigator from ignorance to knowledge. Descartes and Bacon sometimes wrote as if they could offer so ideal a theory, but after the mid-20th century the orthodox view was that this is too much to ask for. Following Hans Reichenbach, philosophers often distin- guished between the ―context of discovery‖ and the ―context of justifi- cation.‖ Once a hypothesis has been proposed, there are canons of logic that determine whether or not it should be accepted – that is, there are rules of method that hold in the context of justification. There are, how- ever, no such rules that will guide someone to formulate the right hy- pothesis, or even hypotheses that are plausible or fruitful. The logical empiricists were led to this conclusion by reflecting on cases in which scientific discoveries were made either by imaginative leaps or by lucky accidents; a favourite example was the hypothesis by August Kekulé that benzene molecules have a hexagonal structure, allegedly formed as he was dozing in front of a fire in which the live coals seemed to resem- ble a snake devouring its own tail.

Although the idea that there cannot be logic of scientific discovery often assumed the status of orthodoxy, it was not unquestioned. As will become clear below, one of the implications of the influential work of Thomas Kuhn in the philosophy of science was that considerations of the likelihood of future discoveries of particular kinds are sometimes entangled with judgments of evidence, so discovery can be dismissed as an irrational process only if one is prepared to concede that the irration- ality also infects the context of justification itself.

Sometimes in response to Kuhn and sometimes for independent rea- sons, philosophers tried to analyze particular instances of complex sci- entific discoveries, showing how the scientists involved appear to have followed identifiable methods and strategies. The most ambitious re- sponse to the empiricist orthodoxy tried to do exactly what was aban-

doned as hopeless – to wit, specify formal procedures for producing hy- potheses in response to an available body of evidence. So, for example, the American philosopher Clark Glymour and his associates wrote com- puter programs to generate hypotheses in response to statistical evi- dence, hypotheses that often introduced new variables that did not them- selves figure in the data. These programs were applied in various tradi- tionally difficult areas of natural and social scientific research. Perhaps, then, logical empiricism was premature in writing off the context of dis- covery as beyond the range of philosophical analysis.

In contrast, logical empiricists worked vigorously on the problem of understanding scientific justification. Inspired by the thought that Frege, Russell, and Hilbert had given a completely precise specification of the conditions under which premises deductively imply a conclusion, phi- losophers of science hoped to offer a ―logic of confirmation‖ that would identify, with equal precision, the conditions under which a body of evi- dence supported a scientific hypothesis. They recognized, of course, that a series of experimental reports on the expansion of metals under heat would not deductively imply the general conclusion that all metals ex- pand when heated – for even if all the reports were correct, it would still be possible that the very next metal to be examined failed to expand un- der heat. Nonetheless, it seemed that a sufficiently large and sufficiently varied collection of reports would provide some support, even strong support, for the generalization. The philosophical task was to make pre- cise this intuitive judgment about support.

During the 1940s, two prominent logical empiricists, Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel, made influential attempts to solve this problem. Car- nap offered a valuable distinction between various versions of the ques- tion.  The  ―qualitative‖  problem  of  confirmation  seeks  to  specify  the conditions under which a body of evidence E supports, to some degree, a hypothesis H. The ―comparative‖ problem seeks to determine when one body of evidence E supports a hypothesis H more than a body of evidence E* supports a hypothesis H*. Finally, the ―quantitative‖ prob- lem seeks a function that assigns a numerical measure of the degree to which E supports H. The comparative problem attracted little attention, but Hempel attacked the qualitative problem while Carnap concentrated on the quantitative problem.

It would be natural to assume that the qualitative problem is the easi- er of the two, and even that it is quite straightforward. Many scientists were attracted to the idea of hypothetico-deductivism, or

the hypothetico-deductive method: scientific hypotheses are confirmed by deducing from them predictions about empirically determinable phe- nomena, and, when the predictions hold good, support accrues to the hypotheses from which those predictions derive. Hempel‘s explorations revealed why so simple a view could not be maintained. An apparent- ly innocuous point about support seems to be that, if E confirms H, then E confirms any statement that can be deduced from H. Suppose, then, that H deductively implies E, and E has been ascertained by observation or experiment. If H is now conjoined with any arbitrary statement, the resulting conjunction will also deductively imply E. Hypothetico- deductivism says that this conjunction is confirmed by the evidence. By the innocuous point, E confirms any deductive consequence of the con- junction. One such deductive consequence is the arbitrary statement.

To see how bad this is, consider one of the great predictive theories – for example, Newton‘s account of the motions of the heavenly bodies. Hypothetico-deductivism looks promising in cases like this, precisely because Newton‘s theory seems to yield many predictions that can be checked and found to be correct. But if one tacks on to Newtonian theo- ry any doctrine one pleases – perhaps the claim that global warming is the result of the activities of elves at the North Pole – then the expanded theory will equally yield the old predictions. On the account of confir- mation just offered, the predictions confirm the expanded theory and any statement that follows deductively from it, including the elfin warming theory.

Hempel‘s work showed that this was only the start of the complexi- ties of the problem of qualitative confirmation, and, although he and later philosophers made headway in addressing the difficulties, it seemed to many confirmation theorists that the quantitative problem was more tractable. Carnap‘s own attempts to tackle that problem, car- ried out in the 1940s and ‘50s, aimed to emulate the achievements of deductive logic. Carnap considered artificial systems whose expressive power falls dramatically short of the languages actually used in the prac- tice of the sciences, and he hoped to define for any pair of statements in his restricted languages a function that would measure the degree to which the second supports the first. His painstaking research made it apparent that there were infinitely many functions satisfying the criteria he considered admissible. Despite the failure of the official project, however, he argued in detail for a connection between confirmation and probability, showing that, given certain apparently reasonable assump-

tions, the degree-of-confirmation function must satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

Bayesian confirmation was extended in the most prominent contem- porary approach to issues of confirmation, so-called Bayesianism, named for the English clergyman and mathematician Thomas Bayes. The guiding thought of Bayesianism is that acquiring evidence modifies the probability rationally assigned to a hypothesis.

Any use of Bayes‘s theorem to reconstruct scientific reasoning plain- ly depends on the idea that scientists can assign the pertinent probabili- ties, both the prior probabilities and the probabilities of the evidence conditional on various hypotheses. But how should scientists conclude that the probability of an interesting hypothesis takes on a particular value or that a certain evidential finding would be extremely improbable if the interesting hypothesis were false? The simple example about drawing from a deck of cards is potentially misleading in this respect, because in this case there seems to be available a straightforward means of calculating the probability that a specific card, such as the king of hearts, will be drawn. There is no obvious analogue with respect to sci- entific hypotheses. It would seem foolish, for example, to suppose that there is some list of potential scientific hypotheses, each of which is equally likely to hold true of the universe.

Bayesians are divided in their responses to this difficulty. A relative- ly small minority – the so-called ―objective‖ Bayesians – hope to find objective criteria for the rational assignment of prior probabilities. The majority position – ―subjective‖ Bayesianism, sometimes also called personalism – supposes, by contrast, that no such criteria are to be found. The only limits on rational choice of prior probabilities stem from the need to give each truth of logic and mathematics the probabil- ity 1 and to provide a value different from both 0 and 1 for every empir- ical statement. The former proviso reflects the view that the laws of log- ic and mathematics cannot be false; the latter embodies the idea that any statement whose truth or falsity is not determined by the laws of logic and mathematics might turn out to be true.

On the face of it, subjective Bayesianism appears incapable of providing any serious reconstruction of scientific reasoning. Thus, imag- ine two scientists of the late 17th century who differ in their initial as- sessments of Newton‘s account of the motions of the heavenly bodies. One begins by assigning the Newtonian hypothesis a small but signifi- cant probability; the other attributes a probability that is truly minute. As

they collect evidence, both modify their probability judgments in ac- cordance with Bayes‘s theorem, and, in both instances, the probability of the Newtonian hypothesis goes up. For the first scientist it approaches

1. The second, however, has begun with so minute a probability that, even with a large body of positive evidence for the Newtonian hypothe- sis, the final value assigned is still tiny. From the subjective Bayesian perspective, both have proceeded impeccably. Yet, at the end of the day, they diverge quite radically in their assessment of the hypothesis.

If one supposes that the evidence obtained is like that acquired in the decades after the publication of Newton‘s hypothesis in his Principia, it may seem possible to resolve the issue as follows: even though both investigators were initially skeptical (both assigned small prior probabil- ities to Newton‘s hypothesis), one gave the hypothesis a serious chance and the other did not; the inquirer who started with the truly minute probability made an irrational judgment that infects the conclusion. No subjective Bayesian can tolerate this diagnosis, however. The Newtoni- an hypothesis is not a logical or mathematical truth, and both scientists give it a probability different from 0 and 1. By subjective Bayesian standards, that is all rational inquirers are asked to do.

The orthodox response to worries of this type is to offer mathemati- cal theorems that demonstrate how individuals starting with different prior probabilities will eventually converge on a common value. Indeed, were the imaginary investigators to keep going long enough, their even- tual assignments of probability would differ by an amount as tiny as one cared to make it. In the long run, scientists who lived by Bayesian standards would agree. But, as the English economist John Maynard Keynes once observed, in the long run we are all dead. Scientific deci- sions are inevitably made in a finite period of time, and the same math- ematical explorations that yield convergence theorems will also show that, given a fixed period for decision making, however long it may be, there can be people who satisfy the subjective Bayesian requirements and yet remain about as far apart as possible, even at the end of the evi- dence-gathering period.

Subjective Bayesianism is currently the most popular view of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses, partly because it seems to accord with important features of confirmation and partly because it is both systematic and precise. But the worry just outlined is not the only con- cern that critics press and defenders endeavour to meet. Among others is the objection that explicit assignments of probabilities seem to figure in

scientific reasoning only when the focus is on statistical hypotheses. A more homely view of testing and the appraisal of hypotheses suggests that scientists proceed by the method of Sherlock Holmes: they formu- late rival hypotheses and apply tests designed to eliminate some until the hypothesis that remains, however antecedently implausible, is judged correct. Unlike Bayesianism, this approach to scientific reason- ing is explicitly concerned with the acceptance and rejection of hypothe- ses and thus seems far closer to the everyday practice of scientists than the revision of probabilities. But eliminativism, as this view is some- times called, also faces serious challenges.

The first main worry centres on the choice of alternatives. In the set- ting of the country-house murder, Sherlock Holmes has a clear list of suspects. In scientific inquiries, however, no such complete roster of potential hypotheses is available. For all anyone knows, the correct hy- pothesis might not figure among the rivals under consideration. How then can the eliminative procedure provide any confidence in the hy- pothesis left standing at the end? Eliminativists are forced to concede that this is a genuine difficulty and that there can be many situations in which it is appropriate to wonder whether the initial construction of pos- sibilities was unimaginative. If they believe that inquirers are sometimes justified in accepting the hypothesis that survives an eliminative pro- cess, then they must formulate criteria for distinguishing such situations. By the early 21st century, no one had yet offered any such precise crite- ria.

An apparent method of avoiding the difficulty just raised would be to emphasize the tentative character of scientific judgment. This tactic was pursued with considerable thoroughness by the Austrian-born British philosopher Karl Popper, whose views about scientific reasoning proba- bly had more influence on practicing scientists than those of any other philosopher. Although not himself a logical positivist, Popper shared many of the aspirations of those who wished to promote ―scientific phi- losophy.‖ Instead of supposing that traditional philosophical discussions failed because they lapsed into meaninglessness, he offered a criterion of demarcation in terms of the falsifiability of genuine scientific hypoth- eses. That criterion was linked to his reconstruction of scientific reason- ing: science, he claimed, consists of bold conjectures that scientists en- deavour to refute, and the conjectures that survive are given tentative acceptance. Popper thus envisaged an eliminative process that begins with the rival hypotheses that a particular group of scientists happen to

have thought of, and he responded to the worry that the successful sur- vival of a series of tests might not be any indicator of truth by emphasiz- ing that scientific acceptance is always tentative and provisional.

Popper‘s influence on scientists reflected his ability to capture fea- tures that investigators recognized in their own reasoning. Philosophers, however, were less convinced. For however much he emphasized the tentative character of acceptance, Popper – like the scientists who read him – plainly thought that surviving the eliminative process makes a hypothesis more worthy of being pursued or applied in a practical con- text. The ―conjectures‖ are written into textbooks, taught to aspiring sci- entists, relied on in further research, and used as the basis for interven- tions in nature that sometimes affect the well-being of large numbers of people. If they attain some privileged status by enduring the fire of elim- inative testing, then Popper‘s view covertly presupposes a solution to the worry that elimination has merely isolated the best of a bad lot. If, on the other hand, the talk about ―tentative acceptance‖ is taken serious- ly, and survival confers no special privilege, then it is quite mysterious why anybody should be entitled to use the science ―in the books‖ in the highly consequential ways it is in fact used. Popper‘s program was at- tractive because it embraced the virtues of eliminativism, but the rhetoric of ―bold conjectures‖ and ―tentative acceptance‖ should be viewed as a way of ducking a fundamental problem that eliminativists face.

A second major worry about eliminativism charged that the notion of falsification is more complex than eliminativists allowed. As the philos- opher-physicist Pierre Duhem pointed out, experiments and observa- tions typically test a bundle of different hypotheses. When a complicat- ed experiment reveals results that are dramatically at odds with predic- tions, a scientist‘s first thought is not to abandon a cherished hypothesis but to check whether the apparatus is working properly, whether the samples used are pure, and so forth. A particularly striking example of this situation comes from the early responses to the Copernican system.

Astronomers of the late 16th century, virtually all of whom believed in the traditional view that the heavenly bodies revolved around the Earth, pointed out that if, as Copernicus claimed, the Earth is in motion, then the stars should be seen at different angles at different times of the year; but no differences were observed, and thus Copernicanism, they concluded, is false. Galileo, a champion of the Copernican view, replied that the argument is fallacious. The apparent constancy of the angles at

which the stars are seen is in conflict not with Copernicanism alone but with the joint hypothesis that the Earth moves and that the stars are rela- tively close. Galileo proposed to ―save‖ Copernicanism from falsifica- tion by abandoning the latter part of the hypothesis, claiming instead that the universe is much larger than had been suspected and that the nearest stars are so distant that the differences in their angular positions cannot be detected with the naked eye.

Eliminativism needs an account of when it is rationally acceptable to divert an experimental challenge to some auxiliary hypothesis and when the hypothesis under test should be abandoned. It must distinguish the case of Galileo from that of someone who insists on a pet hypothesis in the teeth of the evidence, citing the possibility that hitherto unsuspected spirits are disrupting the trials. The problem is especially severe for Popper‘s version of eliminativism, since, if all hypotheses are tentative, there would appear to be no recourse to background knowledge, on the basis of which some possibilities can be dismissed as just not serious.

The complexities of the notion of falsification, originally diagnosed by Duhem, had considerable impact on contemporary philosophy of sci- ence through the work of the American philosopher W.V.O. Quine. Quine proposed a general thesis of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, arguing that it is always possible to preserve any hypothesis in the face of any evidence. This thesis can be understood as a bare logical point, to the effect that an investigator can always find some consistent way of dealing with observations or experiments so as to continue to maintain a chosen hypothesis. So conceived, it appears trivial. Alterna- tively, one can interpret it as proposing that all the criteria of rationality and scientific method permit some means of protecting the favoured hypothesis from the apparently refuting results. On the latter reading, Quine went considerably beyond Duhem, who held that the ―good sense‖ of scientists enables them to distinguish legitimate from illegiti- mate ways of responding to recalcitrant findings.

The stronger interpretation of the thesis is sometimes inspired by a small number of famous examples from the history of physics. In the early 18th century, there was a celebrated debate between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, an acolyte of Newton, over the ―true motions‖ of the heavenly bodies. Clarke, following Newton, defined true motion as mo- tion with respect to absolute space. He claimed that the centre of mass of the solar system was at rest with respect to absolute space. Leibniz countered by suggesting that, if the centre of mass of the solar system

were moving with uniform velocity with respect to absolute space, all the observations one could ever make would be the same as they would be if the universe were displaced in absolute space. In effect, he offered infinitely many alternatives to the Newtonian theory, each of which seemed equally well supported by any data that could be collected. Re- cent discussions in the foundations of physics sometimes suggested a similar moral. Perhaps there are rival versions of string theory, each of which is equally well supported by all the evidence that could become available.

Such examples, which illustrate the complexities inherent in the no- tion of falsification, raise two important questions: first, when cases of underdetermination arise, what is it reasonable to believe? And second, how frequently do such cases arise? One very natural response to the motivating examples from physics is to suggest that, when one recog- nizes that genuinely rival hypotheses could each be embedded in a body of theory that would be equally well supported by any available evi- dence, one should look for a more minimal hypothesis that will some- how ―capture what is common‖ to the apparent alternatives. If that natu- ral response is right, then the examples do not really support Quine‘s sweeping thesis, for they do not permit the rationality of believing either of a pair of alternatives but rather insist on articulating a different, more minimal, view.

A second objection to the strong thesis of underdetermination is that the historical examples are exceptional. Certain kinds of mathematical theories, together with plausible assumptions about the evidence that can be collected, allow for the formulation of serious alternatives. In most areas of science, however, there is no obvious way to invoke genu- ine rivals. Since the 1950s, for example, scientists have held that DNA molecules have the structure of a double helix, in which the bases jut inward, like the rungs of a ladder, and that there are simple rules of base pairing. If Quine‘s global thesis were correct, there should be some sci- entific rival that would account equally well for the vast range of data that supports this hypothesis. Not only has no such rival been proposed, but there are simply no good reasons for thinking that any exists.

Many contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science take up the issues of this section, seeking algorithms for scientific discovery, attempting to respond to the worries about Bayesian confirmation theory or to develop a rival, and exploring the notions of falsification and un- derdetermination. These discussions often continue the inquiries begun

by the principal logical empiricists – Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, and Popper – adhering to the conceptions of science and philosophy that were central to their enterprise. For a significant number of philoso- phers, however, the questions posed in this section were transformed by reactions to logical empiricism, by the historicist turn in the philosophy of science, and by the increasing interest in the social dimensions of sci- entific research. As will be discussed in later sections, some of the is- sues already raised arise in different forms and with more disturbing implications. In Belarus studies methodological problems of the Minsk methodological school.